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 Optimal Quality Certification
By Andriy Zapechelnyuk∗
Quality certification not only informs consumers, but also stim-
ulates producers to supply better quality products. We study a
problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting. We
show that, under standard assumptions, simple certification sys-
tems, such as quality assurance rule and pass-fail rule, are optimal.
Our solution method involves interpreting the certification problem
as a delegation problem.
JEL: D82, D86, D45
Keywords: Certification, Bayesian persuasion, information dis-
closure, information design, delegation, moral hazard, career con-
cerns
Consumers often do not observe the true quality of products, thus relying on
indirect methods of ascertaining their worth. One of such methods is certifica-
tion, where an independent certifier verifies conformity of a product to specified
standards. Certification is often mandatory and regulated by the government,
especially when it concerns health, safety, and wellbeing. For example, car manu-
facturers must disclose conformity to crash safety standards. Childcare and educa-
tional organizations obtain accreditation from an office on standards in education.
Restaurants and catering businesses obtain food hygiene certificates from a food
standards agency. Food manufacturers must conform to disclosure requirements
of nutritional and allergy information on their products.
We are interested in the power of certification in motivating producers to im-
prove the quality of their products. As in the persuasion literature set in motion
by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we focus on the role of information disclos-
ure through certification, and shut down all other channels of influence, such as
certification fees, warranty requirements, consumer rights protection laws, and
product marketing regulations.
We consider a simple, stylized model of quality certification that features a
monopoly producer, a representative consumer, and a regulator. The producer
chooses a quality and a price of an indivisible good. The price is freely chosen
and observable, whereas the quality is costly and unobservable to the consumer.
Information about the quality is only available through a certification rule that
assigns a rating to each quality. The consumer observes the price and the certi-
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fication rating, and buys the good whenever its expected net value exceeds the
consumer’s private outside option.
The regulator’s task is to choose a certification rule that maximizes the expected
consumer surplus.1 The regulator commits to a certification rule ex-ante. Thus,
the producer’s quality and price decisions depend on both the certification rule
and the producer’s private cost of quality. Through certification, the regulator
balances the tradeoff between flexibility and control. A finer certification gives
the producer more flexibility to use her private information efficiently, whereas
a coarser certification gives the regulator more control to limit the producer’s
monopoly power and to redistribute the surplus to the consumer.
Suppose that the probability density of the producer’s type is single-peaked.
This is a standard assumption, and it includes increasing and decreasing density as
special cases. Then optimal certification takes a simple form of quality assurance.
A quality assurance rule reveals the quality if and only if it meets or exceeds a
specified threshold, in effect, preventing sales of products whose quality is below
the threshold.
In addition, suppose that the producer’s cost variation, which is unobservable
to the regulator, is not too big.2 This can be realistic in many applications: The
regulator is more likely to be unable to observe (and condition upon) small cost
differences. For example, a food standards agency may be uncertain about costs
of hygiene among fast-food outlets. However, it will be aware of the cost difference
between fast-food and sushi restaurants, thus being able to impose different qual-
ity standards. Where this assumption is met, pass-fail certification is optimal. A
pass-fail rule is a widespread certification method in practice. It certifies whether
or not the product satisfies a specified quality standard. Intuitively, the regulator
sets a quality standard strictly above what any type of the profit-maximizing
producer would prefer. Most producer types choose to meet this standard, at the
expense of some low types in the tail of the distribution, who prefer to shut down.
An optimal quality standard balances the tradeoff between a better quality by
participating producers and a better participation rate.
We tackle the problem of optimal certification as follows. First, we show that
it can be expressed as a delegation problem with a producer’s participation con-
straint. Then, using the equivalence between delegation and persuasion (Kolotilin
and Zapechelnyuk 2019), we recast it as a monotone persuasion problem. Finally,
we apply standard tools in the persuasion literature to solve it.
Note the standard method from the delegation literature (Amador and Bagwell
2013) does not address delegation problems with participation constraint, so using
the method of Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk (2019) is justified here and, moreover,
it is easy to apply and brings additional insights by connecting the problem to
the persuasion literature. Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk (2019, Section 4) apply this
1Our analysis can be easily adapted to the model with a welfare-maximizing regulator. This is further
discussed in Section VI.
2This assumption is made precise in Section V.
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method to solve the monopoly regulation problem. Although the intuition behind
this method is similar, the certification problem is structurally different from the
monopoly regulation problem, e.g., it features a two-dimensional decision (quality
and price) and requires more stringent assumptions on the demand and cost
functions to ensure existence of an interior solution. Whether or not it is easy to
reduce the certification problem to the monopoly regulation problem, this paper
has an advantage of providing any follow-up studies with a more fundamental
method of solving it, rather than redirecting them to a different problem.
Related Literature.—There is a vast literature on certification and verifiable
disclosure. The substantial part of this literature focuses on the phenomenon of
unraveling and its limitations, where the quality is exogenous (we refer to Dranove
and Jin (2010) for an overview, and to Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman (2017)
and DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2019) for more recent models that involve
Bayesian persuasion). In contrast, our paper studies certification of products with
endogenous quality, with moral hazard being the central issue. In what follows,
we restrict attention to papers that address certification under moral hazard.
A related paper is Zubrickas (2015) who studies optimal grading policy in a
mathematically similar, but contextually different setting, where a teacher motiv-
ates a student to exert effort. The main difference from our paper is that, in effect,
the teacher can impose grade-contingent transfers on the student, thus making it
a problem of mechanism design with limited transfers (Condorelli 2012, Chakrav-
arty and Kaplan 2013, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk 2017), whereas transfers are
prohibited in our model. As a result, optimal certification rules are very differ-
ent: e.g., Zubrickas (2015) has pooling of high types, and we have pooling of low
types.3
Another related paper is Albano and Lizzeri (2001) who study a certification
problem in a similar production-trade setting. As Zubrickas (2015), this paper
allows certification-contingent transfers. Another difference from our paper is that
the certifier in Albano and Lizzeri (2001) is selfish and maximizes the proceeds
from certification, whereas in our model the certifier acts in the interests of the
consumer. Our paper complements Albano and Lizzeri (2001) as it targets a
different set of applications and solves a different optimal design problem.
Further back in time, Shapiro (1986) addresses the question of the value of
certification and licensing in a two-stage setting where disclosure at the early
stage substitutes reputation at the late stage. Shapiro (1986) considers binary
output, so certification essentially reduces to fully informative and uninformative.
Our paper contributes into an emerging strand of literature on Bayesian per-
suasion with moral hazard. Boleslavsky and Kim (2018) develop a general meth-
odology of addressing this problem by extending the concavification method of
3Two other papers that study optimal grading with moral hazard are Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010)
and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015). Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010) consider this problem in the context
of games of status (where payoffs depend on ordinal ranking). Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) study
a model of competition between certifiers; they assume binary quality, and thus only compare fully
informative and uninformative certification.
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Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and provide a technical characterization in two
special cases, binary state and binary decision. Rodina (2017) considers a some-
what less general problem, where the agent has no private information when
making an effort decision. Both papers consider general information disclosure
structures and do not address our question of optimization on the space of par-
titional information structures. Feng and Lu (2016) and Zhang and Zhou (2016)
study how information disclosure affects competitors’ optimal spending in con-
tests. Finally, Ho¨rner and Lambert (2016) analyze and solve a dynamic informa-
tion design model with moral hazard, with a long-lived agent whose effort decision
is influenced by information disclosure to the market.
I. Model
There is a producer of an indivisible good, a representative consumer, and a
regulator. The producer chooses a quality x ≥ 0 and a price p ≥ 0. The consumer
decides whether to buy (a = 1) or not to buy (a = 0) the good. If the consumer
buys the good, he obtains the net value of x−p, but he forgoes an outside option
with value θ. The consumer’s payoff is a(x− p− θ).
To produce the good of quality x, the producer pays the cost c(x)/t, where c(x)
is a cost function and t is the producer’s private type that captures production
efficiency (a higher type corresponds to a lower cost). If the good is sold, the
producer receives its price p. The producer’s payoff is ap − c(x)/t. Notice that
the cost c(x)/t is sunk and cannot be salvaged if the good is not sold (a = 0). This
is in line with practice, where manufacturers commit to quality and production
before trade.
The consumer’s outside option θ and the producer’s type t are independent
random variables. Outside option θ is distributed on an interval normalized to be
[0, 1] with a continuous distribution F . Type t is distributed on an interval [
¯
t, t¯],
t¯ >
¯
t > 0, with distribution G that admits a continuous density g. Cost function
c(x) is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, and satisfies c(0) = 0.
Distributions F and G, cost function c, and parameters α,
¯
t, and t¯ are common
knowledge.
The consumer does not observe quality x; instead, he observes a rating produced
by a certification rule. Formally, a certification rule is a right-continuous function
pi : R+ → R that maps each quality x into a rating pi(x). Thus, a certification
rule partitions the quality space and informs the consumer about the partition
element that the quality belongs to.
The regulator designs a certification rule to maximize the consumer surplus.
We will formalize the regulator’s objective later, after required notations have
been introduced.
The timing is as follows. First, the regulator designs and publicly announces a
certification rule pi. Then, the producer privately observes her type t and chooses
a quality and a price of the good. Finally, the consumer observes his outside
option θ, updates his belief about x conditional on the certification rating pi(x),
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and decides whether to buy the good or not.
II. Interpreting Certification as Delegation
The problem that we pose requires optimization over the set of certification
rules. However, assuming that the producer never makes strictly dominated de-
cisions, we can represent it as a delegation problem. Instead of letting the producer
choose any quality x and then publicizing a rating pi(x), the regulator directly re-
stricts the set of quality levels available to the producer, and makes the producer’s
choice observable.
Consider any rating r that can be generated by a certification rule pi, i.e.,
r ∈ ∪x≥0pi(x). Let xˆpi(r) be the smallest quality that yields rating r,4
xˆpi(r) = min{x′ : pi(x′) = r}.
The consumer cannot distinguish between quality xˆpi(r) and any other quality
that yields the same rating r. Because a greater quality is strictly costlier for the
producer, xˆpi(r) strictly dominates any other quality x that yields the same rating,
pi(x) = r. Hence, a consumer who observes the rating r must realize that, among
all qualities that could lead to this rating, the only producer’s undominated choice
is xˆpi(r). In other words, each publicly observable rating fully reveals a unique
rational decision of the producer consistent with this rating. Thus, we obtain the
following property of certification rules.
CLAIM 1: For each certification rule pi, each rating r ∈ ∪x≥0pi(x) reveals a
unique producer’s undominated quality decision, xˆpi(r).
Consequently, in this model of certification with moral hazard, the role of in-
formation disclosure is to restrict the set of undominated decisions of the producer,
similar to the delegation models of Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Amador
and Bagwell (2013). This is different from standard Bayesian persuasion models,
such as Rayo and Segal (2010), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and Alonso and
Caˆmara (2016), where the role of information disclosure is to manipulate beliefs
of a receiver.
For a given certification rule pi, the set of the producer’s undominated quality
choices is given by
X = {xˆpi(r) : r ∈ ∪x≥0pi(x)}.
Note that X summarizes all that we need to know about pi, provided the producer
never makes strictly dominated decisions. Also note that choosing zero quality,
x = 0, is always undominated, so 0 ∈ X. The smallest set, X = {0}, corresponds
to the completely uninformative rule that displays a constant rating regardless of
the quality. The largest set, X = R+, corresponds to the fully informative rule
that reveals the quality, e.g., pi(x) = x. A finite set, X = {0, x1, ..., xn} such that
4Note that xˆpi(r) is well defined, since pi is right-continuous.
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x0 = 0 < x1 < ... < xn < xn+1 = ∞, corresponds to an interval disclosure rule
that displays a distinct rating on each interval of quality [xi, xi+1), i = 0, 1, ..., n.
We restrict attention to certification rules for which the set X is closed, as
otherwise the producer’s optimization problem may not have a solution.5
Denote by X the set of closed, measurable subsets of R+ such that 0 ∈ X.
III. Delegation Problem
We now represent our original certification problem as a delegation problem.
In this problem, the regulator chooses a set X ∈ X of choices available to the
producer (delegation set). Then, the producer privately observes her type t, and
chooses a quality x ∈ X and a price p ≥ 0. Finally, the consumer observes p and
x, as well as his outside option θ, and decides whether to buy the good (a = 1)
or not (a = 0).
Let us formalize and simplify the producer’s and the regulator’s payoffs. As
the consumer’s payoff is a(x − p − θ), his optimal decision is a = 1 if and only
if x − p − θ ≥ 0.6 Thus, the probability that the good with observed quality x
is sold at price p is Pr[θ ≤ x − p] = F (x − p). So, the producer’s payoff can be
expressed as
(1) u(t, x) = max
p≥0
pF (x− p)− c(x)
t
.
For the delegation problem to be well defined, we need to impose restrictions on
functions F and c, so that the profit-maximizing price p and quality x are unique
for all types of the producer (except, perhaps, for a measure zero of types). To
this end, we introduce two assumptions:
F (θ) = θα, α > 0,(A1)
c′(x)
xα
is strictly increasing;
c′(x)
xα
> t¯ for some x > 0.(A2)
Distribution F plays the role of the demand function. Assumption A1, though
restrictive, allows for linear demand (α = 1), concave demand where consumers
with low outside option are more numerous (α < 1), and convex demand where
consumers with high outside option are more numerous (α > 1). Furthermore,
with Assumption A1 the profit-maximizing price p
∗(x) can be explicitly derived
5For example, consider a rule pi(x) = max{1, x}, so X = {0} ∪ (1,∞). So, consumers cannot distin-
guish qualities in [0, 1], but they can distinguish each quality strictly greater than 1. If the producer’s
preferred quality is x∗ = 1, this problem does not have a solution, because the producer would choose
x > 1 that is arbitrarily close to 1. However, a simple tweak in the certification rule, e.g., pˆi(x) = 0 if
x < 1 and pˆi(x) = x if x ≥ 1, leads to the same partition of the quality space, except that x = 1 is now
separated, and Xˆ = {0} ∪ [1,∞) is now closed.
6A tie is a zero probability event.
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for each quality x. Solving
max
p≥0
pF (x− p) = max
p≥0
p(x− p)α,
we obtain p∗(x) = x/(1 +α). Substituting p∗(x) into the producer’s payoff in (1)
yields
u(t, x) = Kx1+α − c(x)
t
, where K =
αα
(1 + α)1+α
.
Assumption (A2) ensures that the above u(t, x) is strictly quasiconcave in x for
each t. Moreover, the producer’s optimal quality choice x∗(t,X) from a set X,
x∗(t,X) ∈ arg max
x∈X
u(t, x),
exists for each t and is unique, except, possibly, for a measure zero of types.
Next, given a quality decision x, the regulator’s payoff is equal to the consumer
surplus,
v(x) =
∫ x−p∗(x)
0
(x− p∗(x)− θ)dF (θ) = α
1 + α
Kx1+α.
Notice the conflict of interest between the parties: the regulator’s payoff v(x)
is increasing in the quality x, whereas the producer wishes to choose the profit-
maximizing quality that depends on his type.
In the delegation problem, the regulator chooses a delegation set X to maximize
the expected consumer surplus,
(2) max
X∈X
∫ 1
0
v(x∗(t,X))dG(t).
IV. Quality Assurance Certification
A certification rule is called quality assurance if there is a threshold
¯
x ≥ 0 such
that quality x is disclosed if x ≥
¯
x and remains undisclosed if x <
¯
x.
Note that under any such rule, the consumer cannot distinguish among qualities
in [0,
¯
x). So, if the producer chooses not to meet the threshold, i.e., x <
¯
x, then
her choice must be x = 0. This is equivalent to shutting down the production, as
the producer’s payoff is zero in this case.
The delegation set that corresponds to the quality assurance rule with a threshold
¯
x is X = {0} ∪ [
¯
x,∞), so the producer either shuts down (x = 0) or chooses a
quality that meets or exceeds the threshold (x ≥
¯
x).
The following result shows that a quality assurance rule is optimal whenever
the density of the producer’s type is single-peaked.
THEOREM 1: Let (A1) and (A2) hold, and let g be quasiconcave. Then a qual-
ity assurance rule is optimal.
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To prove this theorem, we use Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk (2019) to reinterpret
our delegation problem as a linear monotone persuasion problem. Then we apply
Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2019) to prove the optimality of upper-
censorship rules, which translate into quality assurance rules in our setting. The
complete proof is in Section VII.
0
t t
x
τ0(x) τ
∗(x)
x∗(t)g(t)
0
t t
x′
x′′
τ0(x
′) τ0(x′′) τ∗(x′) τ∗(x′′)
x∗(t)
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Quality assurance rule.
Before discussing Theorem 1, we introduce some notations. For a given threshold
¯
x > 0, let τ0(
¯
x) be the type who is indifferent between choosing 0 and
¯
x, and let
τ∗(
¯
x) be the type for whom quality
¯
x is the first best, so
u(τ0(
¯
x),
¯
x) = 0 and u(τ∗(
¯
x),
¯
x) = max
x
u(τ∗(
¯
x), x).
Figure 1(a) illustrates a quality assurance rule with threshold
¯
x. The set of
permitted quality choices is X = {0} ∪ [
¯
x,∞). The solid line depicts the quality
choices of different types between
¯
t and t¯, and the dashed line depicts the density
g of the producer’s type. The types in the left tail of the distribution, t < τ0(
¯
x),
choose quality 0. The types in the right tail of the distribution, t > τ∗(
¯
x), choose
their first best quality x∗(t), where
(3) x∗(t) = arg maxx≥0 u(t, x).
The remaining types that sit in the middle, τ0(
¯
x) ≤ t ≤ τ∗(
¯
x), choose the
threshold
¯
x as their second-best choice (their first-best choice x∗(t) is unavail-
able, as 0 < x∗(t) <
¯
x, so x∗(t) 6∈ X).
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To understand the tradeoff that the regulator faces, let us examine what hap-
pens as a threshold rises from some
¯
x′ to a greater quality
¯
x′′. The effect of this
change is illustrated in Figure 1(b). The solid line and the dashed line depict the
quality choices of different types before and after the change. The types between
τ0(
¯
x′) and τ0(
¯
x′′) reduce their quality choice to x = 0 (in words, they stop pro-
ducing). This is a negative effect, shown as the hatched area in Figure 1(b).
However, the types between τ0(
¯
x′′) and τ∗(
¯
x′′) increase their quality choice to
¯
x′′.
This is a positive effect, shown as the shaded area in Figure 1(b). An optimal
threshold balances these two effects.
V. Pass-Fail Certification
A certification rule is called pass-fail if there is a threshold
¯
x ≥ 0 such that the
consumer is informed whether x ≥
¯
x (pass) or x <
¯
x (fail). The correspondent
delegation set is X = {0,
¯
x}. Under this rule, the producer either prefers to meet
the threshold and get a “pass”, x =
¯
x, or choose zero quality and get a “fail”.
Let us introduce an additional assumption:
(A3) u(t, x
∗(t¯)) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [
¯
t, t¯],
where x∗(t¯) is the first-best quality for the highest type t¯, given by (3). In words,
any producer type gets a nonnegative payoff when choosing the quality x∗(t¯) that
is optimal for the highest type (lowest cost) producer, t = t¯. Intuitively it means
that the difference between the highest and lowest costs is small enough, so that
what is best for the most efficient producer does not drive the least efficient one
out of business. The main motivation for this assumption is that random variable
t ∈ [
¯
t, t¯] captures the regulator’s uncertainty about some unobservable variation
in the producer’s cost. This variation is not too large, as otherwise the regulator
is likely to observe it and condition the certification rule upon it. For example, a
food standards agency might be unable to observe some cost differences between
restaurants in the same category, but it will observe these differences between
restaurants in different categories, and adjust the optimal certification to take
into account the observables.
THEOREM 2: Let (A1), (A2), and (A3) hold, and let g be quasiconcave. Then
a pass-fail rule is optimal.
To understand the intuition, let us return to the quality assurance rule with
threshold
¯
x shown in Figure 1(a). Suppose that the support of types is now
smaller, so t¯ < τ∗(
¯
x), as illustrated in Figure 2. This means that the threshold
¯
x is greater than the producer’s first-best choice x∗(t) for each type t. Even if
qualities strictly above x >
¯
x were permitted, the producer would never choose
them, as they are further away from his preferred choice. It is, thus, irrelevant
whether choices above
¯
x are included in the delegation set or not. So, the quality
                            10 / 17
 10 ANDRIY ZAPECHELNYUK
0
t t
x
τ0(x) τ
∗(x)
g(t)
Figure 2. Pass-fail rule.
assurance rule with threshold
¯
x induces the same producer’s behavior as the pass-
fail rule with the same threshold. Assumption (A3) is sufficient for this to be the
case when the threshold
¯
x is chosen optimally. The formal proof is in Section VII.
VI. Discussion
The paper focuses on a simple model of certification that illustrates our solution
method clearly and concisely. Let us outline the role of the focal assumptions.
The proof of Theorem 1 involves three steps: Representation of the certification
problem as a delegation problem with a participation constraint, translation of
the delegation problem into an equivalent monotone persuasion problem using
Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk (2019), and solution of the persuasion problem using
Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2019). Let us discuss crucial assump-
tions behind each of these steps.
The first step relies on the certifier’s ability to perfectly verify the producer’s
quality choice. In fact, we can consider a more general model where the producer’s
effort (input) stochastically translates into quality (output). What is important
for this step is that input is observable and certifiable. The randomness of the
output can be captured by the probability of sale at a given price, the distribution
F , thus corresponding to our basic model. Certification of input is relevant in
many applications. For example, a food standards agency inspects a restaurant’s
inputs (quality and grade of the equipment, training of the staff, cleanliness of the
premises, etc.), whereas the output (the likelihood of food poisoning) is stochastic.
There are applications where certification of output is more relevant, for ex-
ample, car crash tests. In this case, the producer’s effort stochastically translates
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into output, so the producer cannot guarantee to achieve a certain certification
rating. Though we do not carry out the formal analysis of this extension of our
model, conceptually this is similar. It can be addressed using the same tools and
is expected to lead to qualitatively similar results.
The first step also relies on the assumption that certification deterministically
maps quality to rating. This is motivated by constraints faced by certification
designers in practice. For example, if the rating assignment is deliberately ran-
domized, it is difficult to verify if the certifier followed the prescribed randomiza-
tion protocol, or if he made an intentional choice in exchange of a bribe from an
interested party. Furthermore, solving a model with general information disclos-
ure rules, as in Boleslavsky and Kim (2018), can be more technically challenging.
Whether the methodology of Boleslavsky and Kim (2018) can be adapted to solve
our certification problem remains an open question.
In the second step, once we have a delegation problem with a participation
constraint (that is, the producer can always “opt out” by choosing x = 0), we
convert it into to a balanced delegation problem (in which the extreme decisions
are included in the delegation set) to apply the equivalence result of Kolotilin and
Zapechelnyuk (2019). This conversion relies on Assumption (A2), specifically,
that the producer’s payoff eventually becomes negative as her quality decision
increases. In essence, this is the condition of diminishing returns, which ensures
the existence of an interior solution and which is often assumed in applications.
In the third step, we solve the monotone persuasion problem using an off-the-
shelf technique of Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2019). This technique,
as well as methods in Kolotilin et al. (2017), Kolotilin (2018), and Dworczak and
Martini (2019), apply to a linear persuasion problem where the payoffs depend on
the posterior mean state. Our problem is linear under Assumption (A1) that the
consumer’s outside option θ has distribution F (θ) = θα, α > 0.7 Relaxing this
assumption and addressing a nonlinear persuasion problem remains an avenue for
future research.
In our model, the cost of production is fixed: it is independent of the probability
of sale. Our solution method can be easily adjusted to a combination of fixed and
variable costs. Curiously, in the model where the cost is variable, so the producer’s
payoff is p− c(x)/t from a unit sold, the consumer surplus is proportional to the
producer surplus when the producer chooses the price optimally. That is, the
regulator’s and producer’s interests are fully aligned. So, the optimal certification
is full disclosure of the quality.
We assume that a representative consumer has a private outside option. This
is a standard microfoundation for a downward sloping demand. Other methods
of modeling demand can also be considered.
7If we allow for general distribution F , a different way to satisfy the linearity property is to assume
that the regulator’s payoff is a convex combination of the monopolist’s payoff and the probability that
the good is sold, F (x). The change of variable y = F (x) makes the regulator’s and monopolist’s marginal
payoffs linear in c(F−1(y)), which is what we need to satisfy the linearity of the equivalent persuasion
problem (Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk 2019).
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We also assume that the regulator maximizes the consumer surplus. This is
justified by the observation that certification is often motivated by consumer pro-
tection concerns. However, our analysis can be easily adapted to the maximiza-
tion of any weighted average of the producer and consumer surplus. Our results
(Theorems 1 and 2) remain unchanged under a slightly stronger assumption that
the density of the producer’s type is log-concave, rather than quasiconcave (see
Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk 2019, Theorem 2).
Finally, there is a variety of interesting and practically relevant ways to enrich
the model, such as multiple dimensions of quality and partly na¨ıve consumers,
that we leave for future research.
VII. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we use the equivalence result of Kolotilin and
Zapechelnyuk (2019) (thereafter, KZ) to show that our delegation problem is
equivalent to a monotone persuasion problem. Then, we apply the analysis of
Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2019) (thereafter, KMZ) to solve the
monotone persuasion problem, thus solving our delegation problem by the fact of
their equivalence.
As a preparatory step, we restate our problem as a delegation problem that fits
the framework of KZ. Changing the variables y = x1+α and z = G(t), so that z
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the producer’s and regulator’s payoffs become
u(z, y) = Ky − c(y
1/(1+α))
G−1(z)
and v(y) =
αK
1 + α
y.
Since G−1(z) ≥ G−1(0) =
¯
t > 0, multiplying u(z, y) by the positive constant
G−1(z)/K does not change the producer’s objective. Similarly, multiplying v(y)
by the positive constant (1 + α)/(αK) does not change the regulator’s objective.
We thus obtain the equivalent expressions,
(4) u˜(z, y) = G−1(z)y − c(y
1/(1+α))
K
and v˜(y) = y.
The marginal payoffs are
(5)
∂u˜(z, y)
∂y
= G−1(z)− b(y) and ∂v˜(y)
∂y
= 1,
where
b(y) =
c′(y1/(1+α))y1/(1+α)−1
K(1 + α)
is strictly increasing by (A2).
Observe that, by (A2), there exists a finite number y¯ such that u(z, y¯) <
u(z, 0) = 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the producer strictly prefers 0 to any
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y ≥ y¯. Therefore, we can restrict the domain of y to the interval [0, y¯] and con-
sider the following delegation problem with the regulator’s and producer’s payoffs
given by (4). The regulator chooses a delegation set Y , a closed subset of [0, y¯]
that contains 0 and y¯. The producer observes z, and then chooses y ∈ Y to max-
imize her expected payoff. Note that y = 0 is included in the delegation set by
assumption (because x = 0 is included, and y = x1+α), and the inclusion of y = y¯
does not affect the producer’s decisions, as y = 0 is strictly preferred to y = y¯
for all producer types. We thus have obtained a balanced delegation problem (KZ,
Section 2.2).
Consider now the following monotone persuasion problem (KZ, Section 2.3).
There are an agent and a principal, whose payoffs uP (y, z) and vP (y, z) depend
on an agent’s decision z ∈ [0, 1] and a state y ∈ [0, y¯]. The marginal payoffs
w.r.t. the decision are given by
(6)
∂uP (y, z)
∂z
= b(y)−G−1(z) and ∂vP (z)
∂z
= −1.
The principal chooses a monotone partitional information structure that parti-
tions the state space [0, y¯] into convex sets: separating elements and pooling
intervals. A monotone partition is described by a set Y ⊂ [0, y¯] of boundary
points of its partition elements. Note that Y necessarily includes the extreme
points 0 and y¯.
In this problem, state y is initially unobserved. First, the principal chooses
a monotone partition Y . Then the agent observes the partition element that
contains the state, and chooses a decision z ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes his expected
payoff given the posterior belief about the state. We say that a monotone partition
is optimal if it maximizes the principal’s expected payoff.
The next claim is immediate by KZ’s definition of the equivalence and by The-
orem 1 (KZ, Section 3.1).8
CLAIM 2: Set Y ⊂ [0, y¯] such that {0, y¯} ⊂ Y is an optimal delegation set in
the balanced delegation problem with marginal payoffs (5) if and only if it is an
optimal monotone partition in the monotone persuasion problem with marginal
payoffs (6).
So, to find an optimal delegation set, it suffices to solve the monotone persuasion
problem with marginal payoffs (6). For that purpose, we use a result from KMZ.
First, let us recover the agent’s and principal’s payoffs from (6) by integrating
in z with the initial value condition uP (y, 0) = vP (y, 0) = 0,
9
uP (y, z) =
∫ z
0
(b(y)−G−1(z′))dz′ and vP (z) = −z.
8Note that y needs to be rescaled to be in [0, 1] to fit to KZ model.
9The initial value condition plays no role in the analysis.
                            14 / 17
 14 ANDRIY ZAPECHELNYUK
Next, let us change back the variable t = G−1(z) and define
(7) ω = b(y) = b(x1+α) =
c′(x)
K(1 + α)x1+α
.
We will refer to ω as state. Expressing the payoffs in these variables, we have
u˜P (ω, t) =
∫ t
¯
t
(ω − t)g(t)dt and v˜P (t) = −G(t).
Let m be the posterior expectation of the state ω given the message from a
disclosure rule. As the agent’s payoff u˜P (ω, t) is linear in ω, his expected payoff
depends on his posterior belief about the state only through the expected state
m, so
U(m, t) = E[u˜P (ω, t)|m] =
∫ t
¯
t
(m− t)g(t)dt.
As g is a positive function, U(m, t) is maximized w.r.t. t at t = m, so the agent’s
optimal decision is t∗(m) = m.
Let us now derive the principal’s expected payoff V (m) conditional on m when
the agent behaves optimally:
V (m) = E[v˜P (ω, t∗(m))|m] = −G(t∗(m)) = −G(m).
As we have assumed that g (the derivative of G) is quasiconcave, it follows that
−V (m) is S-shaped. The following result is immediate by Corollary 1 in KMZ:
CLAIM 3: If −V is S-shaped, then an optimal signal is lower-censorship.
So, an optimal disclosure rule is a lower-censorship signal (KMZ, Section 2.2),
i.e., there exists a cutoff ω∗ such that ω > ω∗ is disclosed and ω ≤ ω∗ is pooled.
By (7) and the strict monotonicity of b by (A2), this is the same as disclosing
y if y > b−1(ω∗) and pooling y for all y ≤ b−1(ω∗). Translating this solution
back to the balanced delegation problem, we obtain an optimal delegation set
Y = {0} ∪ [b−1(ω∗), y¯]. Recall that adding any decisions above y¯ makes no
difference, since the producer strictly prefers 0 to any y > y¯. Therefore, the
set {0} ∪ [b−1(ω∗),∞) is also optimal. Finally, changing back the variable x =
y1/(1+α), we obtain an optimal delegation set for the original delegation problem,
X = {0}∪ [x∗,∞), where x∗ satisfies b((x∗)1+α) = ω∗. This is a quality assurance
rule.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1, there exists
¯
x ≥ 0 such that X = {0} ∪
[
¯
x,∞) is a solution to problem (2).
Suppose first that
¯
x < x∗(t¯), where x∗(t¯) is the unconstrained optimal choice
for the highest type t¯ given by (3). By (A3), all producer types prefer x = x
∗(t¯)
to x = 0. So, raising the threshold
¯
x to x∗(t¯) will induce all producers who have
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previously chosen quality x < x∗(t¯) to choose x∗(t¯) instead, which is a strict
improvement for the regulator. Consequently,
¯
x < x∗(t¯) cannot be optimal.
We thus conclude that
¯
x ≥ x∗(t¯). Observe that the producer’s preferred quality
x∗(t) is increasing in the type, so x∗(t) ≤ x∗(t¯) ≤
¯
x for all t ∈ [
¯
t, t¯]. As the
producer’s payoff is strictly quasi-concave in x by (A1) and (A2), each producer
type strictly prefers
¯
x to any quality x >
¯
x, as
¯
x is closer to her preferred choice. It
follows that the quality assurance rule with threshold
¯
x ≥ x∗(t¯) leads to identical
choices as the pass-fail rule with the same threshold
¯
x.
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